Essay to argue that, in Somalia when it comes to fighting against insurgency, military responds alone does not work, for Somalia to win the war against insurgency, it needs military, political, and judicial operations, as stated in the quote “Whatever the shorthand, the point was that winning this kind of war involved more than just fighting. It required military, political, and judicial operations— and all three were essential. The outcome was a matter not of adding the three elements but of multiplying them: if one of the elements was zero, the product of all three would be zero; that is, if one prong of the operation failed, the entire campaign would fail, and thus the insurgents would win” From the book, The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War Kaplan, Fred. The goal of the essay is to explain the importance of not solely concentrating on military solutions alone; we need to emphasize the politics and the judicial. As well as winning the public opinion, getting examples from the attached lecture from Max boot (text of the lecture and video link attached) and stating the significance of the three P’s “The Three P’s. Politics, Propaganda, and Public Opinion. And defining how Somalia national Army like many forces in the world are trained for conventional war and not on how to fight insurgency war, and the Somali people and leaders often make the mistake of assigning military response to an insurgency. I need the essay to convince the Somali leaders and the readers on how we should change our soldiers to support the public, by helping the people with water, schools and build roads. And give the Somali people the incentive to trust and work with the government “counterinsurgent soldier must “be prepared to become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a Boy Scout.” Likewise, “a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun” Kaplan, Fred. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (pp. 19-20). Simon & Schuster Other useful quotes are: “Whatever the shorthand, the point was that winning this kind of war involved more than just fighting. It required military, political, and judicial operations— and all three were essential. The outcome was a matter not of adding the three elements but of multiplying them: if one of the elements was zero, the product of all three would be zero; that is, if one prong of the operation failed, the entire campaign would fail, and thus the insurgents would win. One of Mao’s generals had written that revolutionary war is “20 percent military action and 80 percent political,” and Galula endorsed the formula. “ Conventional operations by themselves,” he wrote, “have at best no more effect than a fly swatter. Some guerrillas are bound to be caught, but recruits will replace them as fast as they are lost.” The insurgents will always return unless and until the population begins to cooperate with the counterinsurgents— that is, with the regime. “The population, therefore, becomes the objective for the counterinsurgent as it was for his enemy.” At various stages in the conflict, a counterinsurgent soldier must “be prepared to become a propagandist, a social worker, a civil engineer, a schoolteacher, a nurse, a Boy Scout.” Likewise, “a mimeograph machine may turn out to be more useful than a machine gun, a soldier trained as a pediatrician more important than a mortar expert, cement more wanted than barbed wire, clerks more in demand than riflemen.” Even when this kind of war required fighting, the rules were different. In a conventional war, a soldier under attack must return fire with the maximum possible force. In counterinsurgency warfare, the reverse was sometimes true, especially if civilians were nearby, as, after all, the ultimate goal of the war was less to kill insurgents than to protect the civilian population.” Kaplan, Fred. The Insurgents: David Petraeus and the Plot to Change the American Way of War (pp. 19-20). Simon & Schuster. Kindle Edition.