Defensive Counter Intelligence

Defensive Counter Intelligence

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nIntroduction

nAfter the extremists attack on global exchange center on 9/11, American militaries initiated a combat against Afghanistan. They initially tumbled the Taliban regime with the assistance of Northern Alliance militaries before the AL Qaeda and Taliban, the central targets of American militaries began radical combat against them (Mirrlees, 2014, p.12). The beginning of 2002 saw American militaries collect evidence that the AL Qaeda and Taliban combatants were putting efforts to reconstruct themselves in Gardez area in East part of Afghanistan at Shahikot gorge adjacent to Pakistan boundary.

nAmerican militaries commenced to design an operation against them in Shahikot gorge and entitled it Operation Anaconda (Mirrlees, 2014, p.18). Traditionally demonstrated, the Shahikot gorge where the battle was implemented was a difficult battleground. Former Soviet Union after invading Afghanistan had suffered a lot and overpowered severely in the region. Therefore, the sole purpose of the operation was to clean up the area from Al Qaeda and Taliban combatants so that they could not launch attacks against American militaries (Mirrlees, 2014, p.27). However, after the operation, numerous researchers examined the procedure in a serious approach and underlined several issues, which influenced U.S. general approach in consecutive years of warfare in Afghanistan.

nAccording to the primary strategy, the procedure was to take less than three days. However, when fight commenced, it took virtually two weeks to conclude. Although American militaries encountered many difficulties, the entire operation was a success (Mirrlees, 2014, p.33). Several military and national specialists of security conducted diverse investigations from dissimilar perspectives of the operation and pointed out some blunders, which transpired during the accomplishment of the task. It is alleged that the lengthy effects of the maneuver were comprehended on the general approach of American militaries in Afghanistan.

n From the investigations, several indicators were recognized to be disregarded during the entire operation from planning to implementation. Contemporary technology has contributed a substantial role in every arena of lifespan (Kelly, Comberiate, Miller & Paxton, 2014, p.7). Like other aspects of existence, it has a prodigious segment in military dominion as well. The entire plan of any maneuver is principally constructed on intelligence information. Earlier information by the AC-130 gunship which had swept the mountain to identify any signs of life using infra-red heat radars had showed that there was nothing and that Takur Ghar was clear (Kelly, Comberiate, Miller & Paxton, 2014, p.13).

nThe Americans however did not recognize that their innovative expertise had been outfoxed by simple scheming. The Al Qaeda units had burrowed deep in snow-covered caves and the rock concealed the heat from their bodies hence they could not be detected by infrared waves (Kelly, Comberiate, Miller & Paxton, 2014, p.19). When the military Generals were creating the approach for the operation, they did not perceive the prerequisite of airborne backing. They ignored airborne constituent to some length but when action commenced, American militaries appreciated the importance of airborne assaults (Kelly, Comberiate, Miller & Paxton, 2014, p.25).

nThey instantaneously interconnected the airborne section to back ground militaries. The aerial assaults played a significant part in the achievement of entire process because at the ground, infantry militaries were seized under dense opponent vigor. It was noticed that the air-ground cooperation had been ignored in official procedure but had been utilized virtually (Kelly, Comberiate, Miller & Paxton, 2014, p.40). Overreliance on technology had thus led to the American commanders to underestimate the number of Islamic fighters, consequently leading to the sending of few military men direct into the hands of many Al Qaeda militants.

nAnother significant problem, which was faced by the American armies during Operation Anaconda, was concerning the command and control organization which was not well assimilated (Cooke & Hubbell, 2015, p.13). There were numerous defects in their command coordination. Harmony of command is an essential code of warfare. It essentially denotes that the militaries or collections which participate in an action, combat or a confrontation should be under a solitary leader (Cooke & Hubbell, 2015, p.18). The elementary principle had been absolutely ignored during the operation. Owing to the neglect, the American militaries suffered greatly and their eight combatants perished.

nAdditionally, the entire U.S. maneuvers in Afghanistan were conducted under the authority of Central Command, commanded by general Tommy Franks. In January 2002, the U.S. intelligence obtained evidence that a huge number of opponent clusters had gathered in East region of Afghanistan (Cooke & Hubbell, 2015, p.23). After the info, resolution of an attack in Shahikot gorge had to be taken to eradicate the area by top-level policymakers. American militaries commenced to formulate a scheme for a major maneuver. Originally, Colonel John Mulholland was selected for the plan. However, later on, the obligation was passed to Major General Franklin Hagenbeck (Cooke & Hubbell, 2015, p.28).

nBesides, the aerial constituent militaries were similarly not under Hagenbecks power as he could just appeal for airborne assaults but not command them. The commandant of the aerial exertion was unacquainted with the scope of the operation until few days prior to the adjusted day for the commencement of the operation (Cooke & Hubbell, 2015, p.32). As an outcome of the late report on the measure of the war, the aerial constituent‘s competence to respond to the condition was condensed, resulting in various difficulties upon the beginning of the ground assault. It encompassed trucks and fighter-bombers being out of ideal locations, unsettled logistical and technical matters on D-Day that decelerated aerial constituent response to vital aerial backing requirements (Cassidy, 2013, p.10).

nAccordingly, when the appeal for aerial backing was unexpectedly bigger than initially projected, the aerial constituent struggled to fill the swiftly pressing stresses of the ground constituent. Their judgements led to a divided and desperately disorganized command organization and a force depressed of much of the warfare power its superiors requested for (Cassidy, 2013, p.16). Therefore, all the action displayed that the control and command organization of air-ground militaries was extremely grave. In the operation, Afghan armies likewise participated although it was completely a ruthless involvement. There were binary aspects principally involved in the involvement (Cassidy, 2013, p.22).

nFirst, Afghan militaries were not completely set and skilled for the operation as the Americans had trained them within a short period. The operation was a prodigious maneuver and necessitated a well-trained power. Due to the deficiency of drill, when Afghan armies encountered weighty fire, they abandoned the battleground at the last minute (Cassidy, 2013, p.31). It demonstrated that the resolution of involving the Afghan force in the assault was tactically a bad resolution. In addition, the Afghan armies were ill equipped to participate in the operation unlike the opponent strength, which was robust and greatly equipped.

nAnother deleterious point of Operation Anaconda was absence of a standby approach. Tacticians continuously create a reserve approach for every single operation. Deep examination of the operation revealed that there were no reserve approaches, which could be utilized at the phase of necessity (Cassidy, 2013, p.36). The operation displays that American tacticians overlooked the central law of combat of not underrating the opponent during the strategy development for the operation. The key reason was that their intelligence information was not correct. Tacticians obtained information from intelligence institutions that there were merely 200 to 300 extremists, but the real number of opponent combatants was approximately 1000 (Cassidy, 2013, p.47).

nThe fight likewise suffered from inaccuracy established on bad intelligence information. The certainty was that approximately 250 combatants were in the gorge when there were in fact approximately 1000. The commanding officers assumed that there were some inhabitants existing on the basin base, but there were none in reality (Cassidy, 2013, p.52). They similarly assumed the combatants were sheltered in the valley with machines firearms as the information stated, but they had excavated on the elevated ground, with sophisticated weapons like recoilless rifles, mortars and missiles.

nFurthermore, there was credence that the Al Qaeda militaries would employ the Taliban act of cut and escape. Instead, they mounted and battled. It also demonstrates that planners considered the opponent a feeble enemy. As a consequence, they confronted severe magnitudes (Cassidy, 2013, p.57). The notion of severe conditions was similarly overlooked from the plot as bad meteorological conditions later slowed down the positioning and affected aerial backing.

nOperation Anaconda likewise advocates the significance of sturdy cooperation of aerial and ground militaries. At strategical level, military leaders did not sense the necessity of robust collaboration between the binary forces (Cassidy, 2013, p.62). They assumed that they could execute the whole mission minus or to some range with a slightest backing of aerial component. However, at the preliminary phase of operation, ground armies encountered substantial fire from opponent side. It was at that period that they comprehended the significance of collaboration.

nConclusion

nIn conclusion, the entire operation was filled with affirmative and undesirable facets. Nevertheless, the significance of the operation played an imperative part in the conversion of diverse magnitudes of U.S. scheme of warfare in Afghanistan (Cassidy, 2013, p.67). Determining the finest method to assimilate the proficiencies of the diverse US martial amenities has been a constant challenge in contemporary combat. Notwithstanding the enormous upsurges in communications and data-allotment competences that have supplemented digitalization, assimilating the exertions of several services endures to present a test (Cassidy, 2013, p.70).

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nReferences

nCassidy, R. M. (2013). Operation Anaconda: America’s First Major Battle in Afghanistan. Parameters, 42, 82-85.

nCooke, L., & Hubbell, G. S. (2015). Working Out Memory with a Medal of Honor Complex. Game Studies, 15(2).

nKelly, M. A., Comberiate, J. M., Miller, E. S., & Paxton, L. J. (2014). Progress toward forecasting of space weather effects on UHF SATCOM after Operation Anaconda. Space Weather, 12(10), 601-611.

nMirrlees, T. (2014). Medal of Honor: Operation Anaconda: Playing the War in Afghanistan. Democratic Communiqué, 26(2), 84.